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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH

SUSAN C. DANA,

]
1

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.

i

CASE NO:

880382-CA

1

CATEGORY

14b

BRUCE C. DANA,
Defendants/Respondent.
Appeal of a Decree of Divorce from the
First Judicial District Court in and for
Cache County, State of Utah
THE HONORABLE JOHN F. WAHLQUIST, Presiding
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The parties were divorced on January 13, 1983, after a
contested hearing before the Honorable Judge Omer J. Call.
At the time of the divorce
children

from

Respondent had

the Respondent had

a previous marriage
three

(3) children

and

three

(3)

the Appellant

and

during

their marriage.

(Transcript p. 3, lines 22 - 25; p. 4, lines 1 - 3, 18 - 25;
p. 5, lines

1-5.)

The Appellant

previous

to her marriage was

employed

with the Civil Service with a GS rating of 5, and upon the
marriage, quit her job, withdrew her retirement and used the
money in the marriage and did not work outside the home for
the eight (8) years between marriage and divorce, but became

employed after the divorce and is currently making between
$17,000.00 and $18,000.00 a year.

(Transcript p. 3, lines

14 - 16; p. 15, lines 5 - 25; p. 79, lines 16 - 19.)
At the time of

the divorce

there was

no

visitation

schedule and support was set by the Court in the original
divorce of $165.00 per month per child.

(Transcript p. 5,

lines 13 - 20; p. 20, lines 16 - 19; p. 21, lines 12 - 14;
p. 73, lines 8 - 24.)
On November 6, 1986, the Appellant filed a Petition to
Modify

the Decree of Divorce requiring visitation of the

Respondent with the children on a set visitation schedule or
to have

the

child

support

increased

to make

up

for

the

alleged benefits lost to the children because of an alleged
lack of regular visitation with the father and other family.
(See Record pp. 124 - 127.)
On December 11, 1986, the Respondent filed an Answer
and Counter-Petition to Modify the Decree of Divorce alleging that due to distances involved and other factors, the
Respondent

was

unable

to

arrange

for

visitation

on

an

alternate weekend basis and further requested that the Court
reduce the Defendant's child support payments during the one
(1) month period of summer visitation, that overall child
support payments be reduced to do Plaintiff's

substantial

increase in income and Defendant's increase in obligations

and that the Respondent be awarded visitation as prayed for
in his Counter-Petition.
The

Respondent

(See Record, pp. 129 - 132.)

has

changed

employers

several

times

since the original Decree of Divorce and his income has gone
from $21,000.00 to $32,000.00 a year, but during that time
the Respondent was also remarried, adopting the child of his
third wife and another child has been born to the parties.
(Transcript p. 49, lines 7 - 8; p. 73, lines 4 - 15; p. 76,
lines 16 - 21; p. 74, lines 12 - 17; p. 75, lines 2 - 8.)
Respondent testified that he had attempted more visits
than acknowledged by the Appellant and made several mentions
to a diary that he kept outlining the visits he made with
the children.

The Respondent did not visit more because of

the hostility

created

by

the

Plaintiff

and

the

children

towards him, which hostility was repeatedly mentioned in the
Findings of the trial Judge.

(Transcript p. 65 - 66; p. 62,

lines 12 - 13; p. 62, lines 23 - 25; p. 71, lines 18 - 24;
p. 94, lines 1 - 4; p. 97, lines 16 - 18.)
A trial was held on the Petitions for Modification of
the Decree

of

Divorce

on

December

29, 1987, before

the

Honorable John F. Wahlquist, Judge Presiding, where Judge
Wahlquist entered
couraged

an Order from the bench wherein he en-

visitation

and

set

specific

visitation

of every

other Friday starting with the first Friday in January at

6:00 until Sunday at 6:00, with the total month of July, and
on Christmas he would pick the children up at 2:00 and keep
them for four (4) days and then they must be returned.

The

Court did not make adjustments for normal Father's Day or
Mother ! s Day,

or

anything

of

that

type

because

of

the

Finding of the inability of the parties to communicate.

The

Court further held from the bench that there was no way the
Court could force the Respondent to visit with his children
except that the Respondent must call the children three (3)
days ahead of time if he's not coming so that the children
would know that he was not coming.

The trial Judge further

held that the Respondent has got to think about the fact
that even though he's got to go through the wrath of hell
sometimes to get to the kids, he ought to go for these three
(3) kids.

(Transcript p. 95 & 96.)

The Trial Court found there was a substantial change in
circumstances
trial

in

record,

regards

that

divorce

has

grossly

greater

and

the

the

to the parties
situation

changed.

emergency

The

of the

since

as

found

the

time

Appellant's
situation

present and the parties should so be treated.
p.

95, lines

4 - 6.)

The Court

further

in the
of

income

is no

the
is

longer

(Transcript

found

that

the

Respondent does have eight

(8) children and that all new

children

thing,

have

to

face

one

that

is when

the

new

brothers and sisters arrive you have to share with them and
that that is the only way the law can handle the situation,
and that the Court is not sure at all that there won't be
more children as constituting a further substantial change
in circumstances.

(Transcript p. 95, lines 17 - 21.)

The

trial Judge entered a new Order basing child support on the
Uniform Child Support Schedule and allowing all eight

(8)

children to count as part of the application of that Schedule, and further ordered that the Appellant be granted the
three (3) children of this parties1 marriage for income tax
deduction

purposes

unless

they

agreed

otherwise.

(Order

Modifying Decree of Divorce)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

The Trial Court findings should not be disturbed

or reversed in a divorce case in equity unless this Court
finds

that

there

has

been

a

clear

abuse

of

discretion

exercised by the Trial Court.
2.

The Trial Court was not under an obligation based

on statutory and case law to award to the Appellant additional child support compensation even if there was, contrary to their record, an irregularity in visitation by the
non-custodial parent.

3.
was

a

The Trial Court did find in open Court that there
substantial

change

in

circumstances

allowing

the

modification of the Decree and the subsequent Order decreasing the previous child support Order.
4.

The Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in

considering two after born children in making a determination that the previous child

support award

should be de-

creased because the Respondent now had eight

(8) children

for which he was legally obligated.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE APPELLATE COURT WILL NOT DISTURB THE
FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT UNLESS THERE
IS A CLEAR ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN A
DIVORCE CASE IN EQUITY.
The Appellate Court in reviewing matters in equity and
more

specifically,

in

a divorce

case, will

refrain

from

disturbing the findings of the Trial Court unless a clear
abuse of discretion by the Trial Court is shown.
The
recently

standard
considered

for
by

reviewing
the Utah

matters
Supreme

Construction, Inc., v. Southam, 722 P.2d

in

equity

was

in J

& M

Court
779

(Utah 1986),

wherein the Court held as follows:
In reviewing matters in equity, this
Court will reverse the Trial Court only
(emphasis
added)
when
the
evidence

clearly
preponderates
against
the
findings below. Although we may review
that
evidence, we
are
particularly
mindful of the advantage position of the
Trial Court to hear, weigh, and evaluate
the testimony of the parties. (Cites
omitted) Where the evidence may be in
conflict, this Court will not upset the
findings below unless the evidence so
clearly preponderates against them that
this Court is convinced that a manifest
injustice has been done...
The Utah Supreme Court in regards to a modification of
the Decree of Divorce and an Appellate Court standards for
reviewing those matters held in Christensen v. Christensen,
628 P.2d 1297 (Utah 1981) as follows:
The modification of divorce decrees is a
matter of equity, and it is the duty and
prerogative of this Court to review both
the facts and the law. (cites omitted)
However, it is likewise true that on
review this Court will accord considerable deference to the judgment of the
Trial Court due to its advantage position and will not disturb the action of
that Court unless the evidence clearly
preponderates to the contrary, or the
Trial Court abused its discretion or
misapplies principals of law.
(cites
omitted)
This Court in the recent decision of Boyle v. Boyle,
735 P.2d 669 (Utah App. 1987) held as follows:
This Court will refrain from disturbing
findings of the Trial Court in a divorce
action unless a clear abuse of discretion is shown.
(Cite omitted)
The
Trial Court is clearly in the best
position to weigh the evidence, determine credibility and arrive at factual
conclusions.

Accordingly, pursuant to case law, unless this Court
finds a clear abuse of discretion in this equity or divorce
matter, it should

not disturb

the

findings

of

the

Trial

Court which stands in a better position to weigh the evidence,

determine

credibility

and

to

arrive

at

factual

conclusions.

POINT II,
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION IN NOT ALLOWING ADDITIONAL
COMPENSATION
IN THE
FORM OF
CHILD
SUPPORT IN THE REGULAR VISITATION OF THE
NON-CUSTODIAL PARENT.
Trial Courts have continuing jurisdiction to consider
motions to modify dealing with child custody and visitation
rights.

The appropriate award is within the Trial Court!s

discretion and is to be reversed only upon abuse of that
discretion.

See Kallas v. Kallas, 614 P.2d 641 (Utah 1980)

which was cited by the Appellant.
In the immediate

case at hand, the Respondent

fully

recognizes as cited by the Appellant that "a Court must come
in

a

custody

dispute, give

the

highest

priority

to

the

welfare of the children over the desires of either parent",
Id. p. 645, and further that, " a child custody proceeding
is

equitable

in

nature

and

must

be

based

primarily

and

foremost on the welfare and interest of the minor children.11

Id, p. 645, "and that the same general principals apply in
determining visitation rights.11

Id. p. 645.

But, in Kallas v. Kallas, the Utah Supreme Court was
dealing with the case of a non-custodial parentfs visitation
rights concerning her request for overnight visitation when
she was an acknowledged lesbian.

Those facts were unknown

to the custodial parent prior to the original entry of the
Decree

of

Divorce

even

though

engaged in those practices.

the non-custodial

parent

The Supreme Court found in that

case that the Trial Court needed to consider pertinent facts
that were not determined concerning the sexuality of the
non-custodial parent to make an appropriate determination as
to overnight visitation privileges and that the Court should
base their decision for overnight visitation on all relevant
evidence as to the children's present and future well-being.
Id. pp. 645 - 646.

Nowhere in Kallas v. Kallas, does the

Utah Supreme Court even address the issue as to whether or
not the non-custodial parent's failure to exercise regular
visitation should result in compensation in lieu of that
visitation.
The Appellant cites this Honorable Court to the Utah
Supreme Court case of Race v. Race, 740 P. 2d 253 (Utah
1987) , in its consideration
visitation.

of child

support and child

The Utah Supreme Court did hold in that case

that "although the awarding of visitation and child support
is within the Court's discretion, the Court must consider
the child's paramount right to and need
support."

for his parent's

The Utah Supreme Court went on to further hold as

follows:
. . . court ordered child support is an
obligation imposed for the benefit of
the children, not the divorcing spouse.
We find no circumstances here which
justify the trial court in deferring
support until visitation between the
children and their father could be
worked out. In the interim, they needed
and were entitled to his support.
The Utah Supreme Court specifically

found in Race v.

Race, that child support and child visitation were not inter-related, that in that case specifically, the custodial
parent was entitled to child support whether or not visitation was being exercised or worked out.

The Utah Supreme

Court did not hold that the custodial parent was entitled to
additional

compensation

or child

support, but rather the

Court held that even if visitation were not worked out the
custodial

parent was

entitled

to

regular

and

appropriate

child support, which in this case, was done.
Utah Code Annotated § 78-45-3 and § 78-45-4, and the
Utah Supreme Court case of Woodward v. Woodward, 709 P. 2d
393 (Utah 1985) fully supports the opinion cited to in Race
v. Race.

Neither those cited statutes nor Woodward make any

mention of the custodial parent being entitled to additional
child support should the non-custodial parent not exercise
regular visitation.
None of the case law or statutes support Appellant's
position

that

should

the

non-custodial

parent

fail

to

exercise regular visitation that the custodial parent should
be compensated by other means or by additional child support.

This is assuming that the non-custodial parent or the

Respondent in this case has failed to exercise visitation,
which is not the case, and even if it were the situation,
again no case law or statutory authority has been cited by
the Appellant nor is any available, which would allow the
custodial parent additional compensation for child support
should the non-custodial parent fail to "regularly" exercise
visitation.
In this case, as previously cited in the Statement of
Facts, the Respondent made several attempts and did actually
visit with the minor

children on several occasions.

The

youngest child, Brooke, became emotionally upset when she
went to visit her father and there were complications there.
(See

Transcript

p.

29)

The

Respondent

also

requested

visitation for the whole summer for the last year and was
not granted that visitation.

(See Transcript p. 31)

The

Respondent has written letters to his children on several

occasions,

(See Transcript

p.

37)

The

Respondent has

attempted on several occasions to make phone calls to his
children and was unable to due to an unlisted number and a
time period when the Appellant was without a phone.
Transcript p. 38)

(See

The Respondent also kept a detailed diary

or journal specifying visits that he had with the minor
children showing visits of once or twice a month based on
the Respondent's ability to travel long distances to visit
with the children.

(See Transcript p. 65 - 66)

The Respondent does not exercise visitation every other
weekend because of the long distances he has needed to
travel, the desires of at least one of the children not to
exercise visitation, and as the trial Judge found, due to
the hostility of the Appellant and her desire to be the
"boss" dictating or determining if and when the Respondent
could exercise visitation.
The
previously

trial

Judge

did

order

specific

spelled out and encouraged

exercise that visitation.

visitation

as

the Respondent to

Accordingly due to the fact that

the Respondent has been timely without failure in paying his
ordered child support, has exercised visitation to the best
of his ability under the specific circumstances spelled out
hereinabove and Appellant's failure to cite any case law or
statutory authority wherein this Court or the Utah Supreme

Court have awarded additional child support for failure to
exercise visitation.

The Trial Court did not abuse its

discretion in ordering the visitation it did and in failing
to order

additional child

support by Respondent

to the

Appellant.

POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT THERE HAD
BEEN A SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES AND DECREASING PREVIOUS CHILD
SUPPORT ORDER.
The Appellant has cited too the cases of Woodward v.
Woodward, 709 P.2d 393 (Utah 1985); Lea v. Bowers, 658 P.2d
1213 (Utah 1983); Kessimakis v. Kessimakis, 580 P.2d 1090
(Utah 1978); and Christensen v. Christensen, 628 P.2d 1297
(Utah 19 81) , to support the premise that in order for a
moving party to obtain a modification of a Decree of Divorce, the party seeking the modification has the burden to
show a substantial change of circumstances.

The Appellant

fully agrees and fully recognizes that the moving party does
have the burden of showing a substantial change of circumstances before a modification of a Decree of Divorce can be
granted.
Although the Order is admittedly deficient in providing
the

substantial

change

of

circumstances

-1 ^-

basis

in

this

matter, Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
entitled Findings by the Court, states as follows:
...in all actions tried upon the facts
without a jury or with an advisory jury,
the Court shall find the facts specifically and state separately its conclusions of law thereon, and judgment
shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58(A):
...it will be sufficient if the findings
of fact and conclusions of law are
stated orally and recorded in open court
following the close of the evidence or
appear in an opinion or memorandum of
decision filed by the Court...
The Trial Court found as identified in the Transcript
that there was a substantial change in circumstances in
regards to the parties in that the situation since the time
of the divorce had grossly changed.

The Appellant's income

is greater and the emergency of the situation is no longer
present, and the Trial Court found that the parties should
so be treated.

(Transcript p. 95, lines 4 - 6 . )

The Court

further found that the Respondent does currently have eight
(8) children and that all new children have to face one
thing, that is when the new brothers and sisters arrive you
have to share with them and that is the only way the law can
handle the situation, and that the Court is not sure at all
that there won't be more children as constituting a further
substantial change in circumstances.
lines 17 - 21.)

(Transcript p. 95,

The trial Judge then entered a new Order

basing child support on the Uniform Child Support Schedule

and allowed all eight (8) children to count as part of the
application of that Schedule.

The Court further held as

further allowance to the Appellant, that the Child Support
Schedule then being used was going to change in July and
that when

that Child

Support

Schedule

changed

that the

Divorce Decree would automatically change along with it.
(Transcript p. 99, lines 2 - 6 . )
Although the Uniform Child Support Schedule that was
used was not admitted as evidence at the time of trial,
there was specific reference to that Schedule which was
admitted as evidence showing that should Respondent's income
vary between $2,795.00 to $2,883.00 gross per month with
eight

(8)

children

which

he

was

supporting,

then

his

obligation would be $94.00 per month per child, which is
what the Court ordered.

(Transcript p. 9 8 & 99.)

As cited above, the Court recognized that the Appellant's income had increased and that the Respondent's income
had increased but the Trial Court stated that the emergency
situation because of these changes had resulted in a substantial change in circumstances and therefore awarded the
reduction.

The reduction was based not only on the changes

in income of both parties but also on the fact that the
Respondent now had a responsibility for eight (8) children
rather

than six

(6) due to the

subsequent

adoption of

another child and birth of another child to the Respondent,
and

the

Court's

recognition

that

there

might be

further

changes with additional children.
The Respondent did testify specifically that due to the
increase in his financial obligations since the time of the
divorce

along

with

an

increase

in his

earnings, he

was

feeling essentially the same kind of financial stress before
the original Divorce Decree and support order as he was at
the time of this hearing.

(Transcript p. 73, lines 8 - 23.)

The Respondent further testified that the financial stress
had reached such a point that he was obligated to borrow
money

to meet

some of his

financial

obligations

and had

reached the point of possibly filing bankruptcy, which due
to the nature of his employment would result in losing his
job so that the Respondent was unable to file a bankruptcy.
He needed other avenues to relieve his financial stress, one
of which included the request for a reduction of payment of
child support.
The Trial Court Judge did not abuse his discretion in
reducing child
spelled

support due to the fact that although not

out in the Order, but rather

in open Court, the

trial Judge did find substantial change in circumstances and
based on those changes did order a reduction in the award of
child support.

POINT IV,
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION IN CONSIDERING TWO AFTER BORN
CHILDREN TO DECREASE THE CHILD SUPPORT
ORDER.
As acknowledged by the Appellant after the Appellant's
and Respondent's divorce, the Respondent married for a third
time.

This

third

marriage

produced

a

new

child

and

obligation for the Respondent, and due to the relationship
of the parties, the Respondent adopted his new wife's child
from a previous marriage.
At
Judge

the time

did

of

consider

the modification

all eight

hearing, the

(8) children

trial

in awarding a

modification in the Decree of Divorce in regards to child
support rather than considering only the six

(6) children

that were present at the time of the original Decree in
reducing the child support.

The Respondent had become the

natural1father of a seventh child and pursuant to proper and
appropriate adoption laws had in essence become the natural
father of an eight child.
The Appellant cites this Honorable Court to the Utah
Supreme Court case of Kiesel v. Kiesel, 619 P.2d 1374 (Utah
1980) to support its position that the Trial Court should
have taken into consideration the third wife's knowledge of
the situation and her responsibility to help provide for her

-1 7-

children in this situation.

Kiesel recognizes the follow-

ing:
While it is true that a stranger to a
divorce action should not be constrained, by reason of marriage, to lend
financial support to his or her spouse's
children by a prior marriage, the Court
is not precluded from taking such
circumstances
into consideration in
determining the ability of one who does
have the legal obligation of support.
Evidence was offered by the Respondent that his new
wife had quit her $8,000.00 a year job to stay home and care
for the children, but the Court based on its discretion,
although a finding of fact is lacking in this area, did not
consider the Respondent's new wife's ability in providing
support for the minor children.

Kiesel v. Kiesel, simply

indicates that the Court is not precluded from taking such
circumstances into consideration in determining the ability
of one who does have the legal obligation of support.

The

Utah Supreme Court does not state there that the Court must
take those circumstances into consideration.

Beyond that,

evidence was produced showing that the Respondent's new wife
or third wife was not working at the present time and had
quit a job that was producing only $8,000.00 a year.
The Appellant then cites this Court to the Utah Supreme
Court case of Christensen v. Christensen, 628 P.2d

1297

(Utah 1981) requesting this Court to find that the Trial

Court abused its discretion in considering the adopted child
and new child of the Respondent subsequent to the marriage
as showing a substantial change in circumstances enough to
warrant

modification

of

the

child

support

payments.

In

Christensen the Court found as follows:
Finally, while it JLs possible (emphasis
added) that the fact that Defendant has
two children by a second marriage could
show a change in circumstances substantial enough to warrant modification of
child support payments, there is no
evidence in the record to warrant so
finding.
It cannot be presumed that
Defendants support obligation towards
his six children by his prior marriage
is changed by the fact he now has two
additional children.
In the immediate

case at hand, there was

sufficient

evidence in the record to warrant a finding of substantial
change in circumstances with not only the two (2) additional
children, but the other factors as referred to earlier in
this brief.
In the immediate case at hand the transcript of the
hearing shows that the Respondent obtained a consolidation
loan of $19,000.00 or a third mortgage to help make ends
meet, or to keep his child support current due to financial
negative cash flow.

(Transcript p. 52 & 53)

The Respondent

further testified as to his basic absolute minimum expenses,
including his three (3) teen-age daughters and his two (2)
other children.

(Transcript P. 54, 55 & 56)

Respondent

further testified that based on his income, his expenses
including

his now teen-age daughters

and two

additional

children, he has a negative cash flow of $1,104.00 a month
and has contemplated taking out bankruptcy, but further, if
he took out bankruptcy he would lose his job because his
employer won't let people that can't handle their financial
affairs for other people work there and they would let him
go.

(Transcript p. 57 - 58)
The trial Judge made specific findings in regards to

the substantial change in circumstances which included the
additional children and the fact that the Defendant had two
children

by

substantial

this

show

circumstances

enough to warrant modification

of the child

support payments.

third

marriage

did

The trial Judge stated that originally at

the time of the divorce there was the immediate emergency of
small children and the Appellant being unable to work or
earn normal monies and that there was a desire to in some
way find a temporary sacrifice or something that would hold
the family together.

The Court believed that the general

situation was now run and that the parties were in the
position of normal divorced people, and that the emergency
had passed.

The Court found that the situation has grossly

changed in that the income of the Appellant is greater and
the

emergency

of

the

situation

is

no

longer

present.

(Transcript p. 9 3 - 9 5 )

The Trial Court further found that

the Respondent does have eight (8) children and that all new
children

have

to

face

one

thing; that

is, when

the new

brothers and sisters arrive, you share with them and that
that is the only way that the law can handle the situation.
The Court again found that this Respondent does have eight
(8) children and that the Court was not sure at all that
there won't be more, and that that was part of the problem,
and the Court did accordingly modify the child support to
include the eight (8) children based on the evidence before
the Court that it did constitute a substantial change in
circumstances.
Therefore, the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion
in considering the additional two (2) children in modifying
and finding a substantial change in circumstances to modify
the Decree of Divorce because sufficient evidence was before
the Court that there was a substantial change due to the
addition

of

the

two

(2) new

children

and

other

circum-

stances.
CONCLUSION
This Court should find based on the standards of review
for an Appellate Court that the trial Judge did not abuse
his discretion in making the awards which denied additional
compensation for an alleged irregularity in child visitation

and which reduced the amount of child support payable by the
Respondent to the Appellant based on a substantial change in
circumstances concerning the parties and the children, and
ultimately the Order of the trial Judge should be confirmed
and the Appellant should not be awarded costs or attorney!s
fees of this appeal.
DATED this 16th day of November, 19 88.

Defendant/Respondent

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this /1Q?
day of November,
1988, I mailed four (4) true and correct copies of the above
and foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by placing same in the
U.S. Mail postage prepaid and addressed to the following:
Lyle W. Hillyard
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
175 East First North
Logan, Utah 84321
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PETE N. VLAHOS, "3337
VLAHOS & SHARP
Attorney for Defendant
Legal Forum Building
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Ogden, Utah 84401
Telephone: 621-2464

IN TriE DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
SUSAN C. DANA,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
vs .
BRUCE E. DANA,

CIVIL NO: 20582

Defendant.
Tnis matter having cone on regularly for trial oefore
the Honorable John F. Wahlquist, o^ the 29th day of December, 19S7, or tne Plaintiff's Petition to >'odif^ tie Divorce
Decree as to visitation and tne claiming of the three (3)
minor children as dependents, and on the Defendant's Answer
and Counter-Petition

to reduce cnild

support, a~d eacr

the parties navjng been sworn and testifying

m

cf

t^eir c< i

benalf, exniojts paving been offered ard

recei/cd, argument

have been made

Court

cognizant

of

to the Court, and

all

matters

pertaining

following:

re

CT
, A'..

the

A - 1

therein,

being

fully

enters

the

i«

KJ

.

t. w _; o

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.
January

That

Plaintiff

and

Defendant

13, 1983, and at the time of

were

divorced

on

the divorce there was

hatred betv/een the parties and there is still hatred.
2.

That

at

the

time

of

the

divorce,

emergency need for the Court to grant

there

ac\

was

to the Plaintiff

her

child support and the Uniform Child Support Schedule provided that the Plaintiff when he earned approximately

$3,000.00

in the year 1983, but that the emergency has ceased in that
the Plaintiff

is

employed

by

the

United

States

government

O

2 Z5UJ=J ?

and has an annual income in excess of $17,000.00.
3.

That the Court finds that

neither

party acted

in

J *r (/] J

^.£5 5
:

S SI o

good faith in that the Plaintiff is continuing her hatred of
the" Defendant and wants to be boss, and
part plus

frustration

in that the three

born as issue of the marriage do
4.

feels guilt en her
(3) minor children,

not have a father.

That che Defendant's motive in having the trial is

that he cannot communicate with his former wife and in order
to reach the children he has to go through the Plaintiff for
communications, which he cannot do.
5.
treated

That
as

an

the Court
ordinary

finds

that

divorce;

this divorce . should

that

the

parties

should

pursue the culture of divorced people in a divorced v/orld.

FIND!. tiCS Or FACT .M\I)
C O N C ; i:sjo::r < F : .v>;

be

Civil No

6.

2050.

That

there

has

been

a

substantial

charge

o

circumstance since the Decree in that the Plaintiff's mcorr
has gone from $3,000.00 per year to $17,000.00 per year, an
that the Defendant's

income has gone

from

$21,000.00 pe

year to $31,380.91 per year, or $2,575.00 per month, bu,
chat: the emergency situation has terminated.
7.

That the Defendant

is now obligated

to

suppor

eight (8) children and since the divorce has remarried; ha
one natural child born as issue of uhac marriage, plus ha
adopted a child for a total of eight (8).
5

8.

That the Plaintiff

receives

$306.00

as and

fc

T
T
CD

5

social security for the three (3) children the Defendant: i

D

z
o

the father of, born prior to his marriage to this Plaintiff

o

9.

That the Court

finds

that

the Plaintiff

cannc

force the Defendant to visit if he doesn't want to.
10.

That the Defendant's present income for purpose

of child support, wnich shall be established m
with

the Uniform

Support Schedule

accordanc

shall be based

on

ti

Defendant's monthly income of $2,575.00 plus the $306 00 h
receives from social security for a total gross income o
$2,881.00, and under the Uniform Child Support Schedule Lc
eight (8) children, it is $94.00 per month.

rJNUPJGS ( i I *"rv ^'P

co;;c\rsu>\ ^ o»

A - 3

11.

That the Uniform Support Schedule is generally set

for the custodial parent to claim the children as dependents
for tax purposes.
12.
Plaintiff

That
was

under

the original

entitled

Defendant two

to

claim

Decree
one' (1)

of Divorce, the
child

and

the

(2) children born as issue of this marriage,

and that Plaintiff has claimed all three

(3) children for

1985 and 1986, and the Defendant has claimed two (2) children per the Decree of Divorce.
13.

That

from

the

above

and

foregoing

Findings

of

change

of

than

nhe

Fact; the Court arrives at the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

That

circumstance

there

since

has

the

been

Decree

a
was

substantial
entered, and

Defendant shall be obligated to pay child support based or.
eight (8) children and his gross monthly income of $2,575.00
plus $306.00 social security he receives for his three (3)
older daughters as a result of his first wife's demise.
2.

That commencing with the month of January, 1988,

the child support shall be based on $2,881.00 for eight (8)
children, or $94.00 per month per
$282.00.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS ON LAW

A - 4

child,

for a total of

3.

That there has been a suostantial change in that

tne Plaintiff's income has increased

from $3,000 00 annual

income in 1983 to in excess of $17,000 00 per year in 1987
4.

That the Plaintiff shall be entitled to claim the

three (3) children as dependents for income tax purposes in
the future.
5.

That tne Court makes no order as to the years 1985

a^d 1986, waen both parties claimed all three (3) children
as dependents contrary to the Court Order, and lea/es it up
to Internal Revenue Service for a determination.
6.

Tnat

tne

Defencant's

visitation

witn

the minor

cnildren snail be every other Friday, commencing witn the
first Friday
6 00 p.m

m

January, 1988,

from 6.00

p.m

Friday to

Sunday, provided however, tnat if the Defendant is

not going to visit tne minor children he must notify them
three (3) days in advance that he is not coming to pick up
the cnildren.
7.

The Defendant

is entitled

Christmas Day at 2 00 p n

to have ire chilcren

and keep t^e cnildren for four

(a) additional days.
8.

Tnat the Defendant snail nave the entire rnontn o[

July for summer visitation, but there will be no reduction
in child support during tne month of July

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS 0^ LAU

A - 5

Civil Jo

9.

?C58.

That Plaintiff nay have Motnei's Day, regardless

of sno / weekend, and Defenaant to have Father's Day, regardless of whose weekend
10
m

That if the Uniform Cnild Support Schedule cnances

July, 1988, then tne cnild support v/ill be cnancec to tre

July, 1988, Schedule without: further hearing ir tris rraccer
11.

That

this

hearing

was

necessitated

because

of

Plaintiff's hatred towards tne Defendant, and per cesire to
be

boss, but

that: the

Defendant

has

oenefited

frc^ tne

hearing
o
z u ~

Si!

H2 -j

<

-J ^

Q

Z> ILI t
c
^ -^
o y2
^ ^u

12.

That eacn of the parties ha/e incurrec attorney

fees and costs and tnat eacn part:./ snould pa_/ sane
DATED this

L

^

day of ^a-w£r y , 1988
BY T^E COURT

§58

/r/
*iO>QRA3LE

JO^\

7

D i s t i n c t : C o u r t Jucg
APPROVED AS TO FORM

15'
i

LYLC W H I L L Y A R D
Attorney for Plaintiff

LO, C n M O , 5 C

J A"
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—IQuIST

PETE M. VLAHOS, §3337
VLAHOS & SHARP
Attorney for Defendant
Legal Forum Building
2447 Kiesel Avenue
Ogden, Utah 84401
Telephone: 621-2464

IN THE DISTRICT COURT 0? CACHE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
SUSAN C. DANA,
ORDER MODIFYING
DECREE OF DIVORCI

Plaintiff,
vs .

CIVIL NO: 20532

BRUCE E. DANA,
Defendant.

This matter having come en regularly for trial before
the Honorable John F. Wahlquist, on the 23th day of December, 1987, on the Plaintiff's Petition to Modify the Divorce
Decree as to visitation and the claiming of the three (3)
minor children as dependents, and on the Defendant's Answer
and Counter-Petition to reduce child support, and each of
the parties having been sworn and testifying in their own
behalf, exhibits having been offered and received, argument
have been made

to the Court, and

the

Court

being

fully

cognizant of all matters pertaining therein, and the Court

Numb

v3Q£&

-C^

:1AY 1 9 108J
ORDER MODIFYING DECREE
OF DIVORCE

StT(-) S. ALLEN, Cfcrt
A -

1

'"••'•

"n-

-^.0i§^

$&r\a vs . Dan
Civil No: 20 53 2

having

made

its

Findings

of

Face

and

Conclusions

of Lav;,

separated stated in writing,
NOW, THEREFORE,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1.

THat

there

has

been

a

substantial

change

of

circumstance since the Divorce Decree was entered on January
13, 1983.
2.

That the Plaintiff's

present

income is in excess

of $17,000.00 per year, and that the Defendant's
$2,575.00

per month, plus

he

receives

$306.00

income is

from

social

security for the three (3) older daughters, nor. the issue of
this marriage, from the demise of his first wife.
3.
eight

That Defendant's
(8)

children

and

child

a

support

gross

shall be based on

income

of

S2,38i.G0,

or

$100.00 per month per child as and for support:.
4.

That

the

Defendant's

visitation

children1 shall be every other weekend
p.m.

through

Friday

in

Christmas

Sunday, at 6:00

I9S8,
Day

and

from

p.m.,

in addition,
2:00

p.m.

and

v/ith

the

from Friday

starting with
shall
four

have

(4) days

at

the

the

minor
6:00
first

children

thereafter

each and every year thereafter.
5.

That if the Defendant is not going to exercise his

weekend visitation, he is to notify

the children three

days prior to the scheduled visitation.

OPDER MODIFYING DECREE
Cf DIVORCE

A ~ 8

(3)

Civil No: 2058o

6.
month

That the Defendant

of

July

for

summer

shall be entitled

visitation,

but

to have

that

the

the

child

support shall not be abated.
7.

That

each

of

the

parties

shall

assume

and

pay

their own attorney fees and costs in connection v/ith these
proceedings .*
8.
income

That the Court makes no Order on the 1985 and 1936
tax

return

filings

Plaintiff claimed all three

made

by

both

parties

wherein

(3) of the children in 1935 and

1986, and Defendant claimed two

(2) per the Court Order in

I

539

1985 and 1986, and leaves that up to IRS and based on the

l<<

original Decree of Divorce.

-

(Si

->

?22
^
o
<^o
iJ 3 o

9.

That the Plaintiff will be entitled

to claim

all

•J

three (3) of the children in the future.

_j

10.

That the State is anticipating a new Uniform Child

Support Schedule to become effective in July, 1988, and if
it becomes

effective, then

ORDER MODI TYING DECREE
OF DIVORCE

the

A-9

child

support

*--'

shall be

in

\\-}-\
or^
WJ-r;^.~<J0

LIV

xi. isO:

^Ubu

accordance with the new Schedule which becomes effective
July, 19 8 8, without further hearing.
DATED this / (j/?

day of May, 1988.
BY T&S) COURT:

HJ&CP^^Z^JTOKU
D i s t r i c t Court

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

7bUUc>.~)&^u^_
!LE W. HILLYARD
Attorney for
PlaintifJ

ORDER MODIFYING
OF DIVORCE

DECREE

A -

10

F . XvAFTLQuIST
J/xdc

m

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

7

I v
day of November,
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
1988, I mailed four (4) true and correct copies of the above
and foregoing Addendum to be included in the BRIEF OF
RESPONDENT by placing same in the U.S. Mail postage prepaid
and addressed to the following:
Lyle W. Hillyard
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
175 East First North
Logan, Utah 84321
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